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Banking is the industry that failed.  Banks are meant to allocate capital to 
businesses and consumers efficiently; instead they ladled credit to anyone 
who wanted it.  Banks are supposed to make money skillfully managing 
the risk of transforming short–term debt into long–term loans; instead, 
they were undone by it.  They are supposed to expedite the flow of credit 
through economies; instead they ended up blocking it.1 
“Give not unto the foolish your wealth which Allah has made a means of 
support for you.”  – Qur’an, 4:5 
INTRODUCTION 
The years 2008 and 2009 have brought the world considerable problems, 
many stemming from bank failures.  The conventional Western system of 
finance is in a quagmire.2  There is a banking system however, that has not 
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suffered much in the present crisis; the Islamic Banking System.3  Islamic 
banks seem to have emerged mostly unscathed in the current phase of the 
crisis, and industrialized Western countries are looking at them to see why, 
and to see if they provide some better ways of doing business.4    Regulators 
in many countries are asking whether the Islamic paradigm has any 
answers.5  Even before the crisis occurred, the United States Department of 
the Treasury unveiled a plan to teach Islamic finance to U.S. bank 
regulatory agencies.6 Islamic banking seems to have been on the minds of 
many Western financiers for a while. 
The University of Reading, in England, recently started a Masters degree 
in Investment Banking and Islamic Finance, as have other universities 
throughout the United Kingdom. John Board, director of Reading’s 
International Capital Markets Association Centre says that  “[w]e started to 
get prospective students asking us if we knew about it [Islamic finance], 
while current students going to job interviews, even for non–Islamic posts, 
said it came up as a conversation piece.”7  
Islamic banking has been proliferating around the world since the 
1970’s.  There are in excess of 300 Islamic financial institutions in the 
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world today in 51 countries throughout the Muslim world, Europe and 
North America.8 
A. Purpose of the Paper 
The measure of the effectiveness of any system of governance is the 
degree to which the governed organization achieves its purpose.  One must 
look at the purpose of the various systems, and ask the question, does the 
system achieve its purpose? Indeed, does the current global economic 
order perforce call for a change in the purpose?9   
This paper intends to describe the governance system of Islamic banks in 
order to see the differences that exist between the Islamic banking paradigm 
and that of its conventional Western counterpart.  This is a timely topic 
since within that governance paradigm there may be elements that can be 
useful in shoring up the risks that conventional banks have faced and which 
have precipitated the current banking crisis.  Certainly the current 
governance paradigm of Western banks is coming under increased scrutiny.  
According to some researchers, “bank regulation will top the global policy 
agenda.”10  It certainly is on the minds of policy makers, commentators and 
the public alike.11  The Federal Reserve is working on new regulations.12 
The British are doing the same.13 
Since the late 1990’s, and especially in the early 2000’s, there has been a 
world-wide dramatic increase in the interest in, and concern for, corporate 
governance.14  Conventional Western bankers also have been concerned 
about widely acceptable and effective principles of corporate governance, 
  
 8. Raed Rafei, Indonesia: Islamic Banking Hailed as Shield                               
From Financial  Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/03/indonesia-islam.html. See also 
Nasser M. Sulieman, Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks, AL-BAB.COM (Oct. 2005), 
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/econ/nsbanks.htm. 
 9. Frederick V. Perry & Sheherezade Rehman, The Transformation of European 
Corporate Governance: A Case of Germany and France, 5 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 
254 (2008). 
 10. Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Governance of Banks, VOX, (Sept. 29, 2008), 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1717. 
 11. Binyamin Appelbaum & David Cho, Geithner to Propose Vast Expansion of U.S. 
Oversight of Financial System, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2009, at A1. 
 12. Bernanke: AIG Shows Urgent Need for New Regulations, REUTERS, Mar. 24, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52N4II20090324; Broad New 
Financial Regulations Unveiled, WCCO.COM (Mar. 31, 2008), 
http://wcco.com/national/new.financial.regulations.2.688411.html. 
 13. See Bank Regulation Approach Wrong, BBC NEWS (Feb. 25, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7910699.stm.  
 14. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were first issued in May of 1999, 
and revised in 2004.  See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
[OECD], OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), [hereinafter OECD 
PRINCIPLES] available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf.   
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so as to make for an effective and transparent international banking system 
in which shareholders, depositors and borrowers alike have confidence.15  
National and international banking authorities agree that banks must be 
supervised—not simply to avoid chicanery, fraud, theft and bank failures—
but also to provide for a system in which businesses and consumers have 
confidence.16  The officials of the Basel Committee believe that effective 
supervision cannot take place unless effective systems of corporate 
governance are in place.17 
The Basel Committee heartily endorses the principles and definition of 
corporate governance as espoused and published by the Organisation for 
Economic Co–operation and Development (OECD), which state: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.  Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined.  Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and 
should facilitate effective monitoring.  The presence of an effective 
corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an 
economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that is 
necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy.  As a result, the 
cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use resources more 
efficiently, thereby underpinning growth.18 
 
So for the purposes of this study, the starting point is the proposition that 
any organization—whether it be simply a club, a company or a state—has a 
controlling mechanism composed of rules, procedures and customs by 
means of which decisions are taken and the organization is run.  Whatever 
  
 15. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (Sept. 1999), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs56.pdf?noframes=1 [hereinafter ENHANCING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 1999].  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of 
banking supervisory authorities which was established by the central-bank Governors of the 
Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory 
authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.  It 
usually meets at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, where its permanent 
Secretariat is located.  Id. 
 16. See generally id. 
 17. Id. at 1.   
 18. OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 14. 
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its system and body of rules and decision-making procedures by which the 
organization is run is the organization’s system of governance.19 
In any corporation, the need for a system of governance arises from the 
inherent agency problem.  In a sole proprietorship, the most prevalent type 
of business entity,20 the owner manages the enterprise, and knows where the 
money goes and where it comes from.  However, in the corporation, owners 
are separated from managers, and it is the latter who actually control the 
operations and finances of the corporation.  These managers are the agents 
of the shareholders, and the shareholders, who wish that their investments 
be fruitful, will want to ensure that the managers do not engage in self– 
dealing; rather, the shareholders will desire that the managers act in the best 
interest of the corporation, and thus of the shareholders’ investment.  The 
main objective of a system of corporate governance is to overcome this 
agency problem—to provide a monitoring system to oversee the activities 
of the agents.21  So, according to some, even though the Western system of 
economic activity considers itself a system of capitalism and therefore an 
ownership system, its system of organization and management of 
corporations is, in effect, a system of agency rather than ownership.22 The 
questions many are asking today in that Western system—especially in the 
financial system—is whether the agents are doing their job properly and 
whether they are being properly monitored. 
Banks are essential in any economy, as they provide financing for 
commercial enterprises, financial services to the population in general and a 
system for making all manner of payments.23  For conventional Western 
banks, the Basel Committee has been very active in providing rules by 
which the banks within its system are governed.24  Government regulatory 
agencies and the banks which they supervise have generally adopted these 
principles, of course taking into account their national and local constraints.  
That is why the conventional banking systems work in much the same way 
on a world–wide basis.   
  
 19. Scheherazade Rehman & Frederick V. Perry, The Global Convergance of 
Corporate Governance Systems: Is it Really Happening?, J. CURRENT RES. GLOBAL BUS. 
(Fall 2004).   
 20. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, of the 25 million business entities in 
the United States, over 91% are sole proprietorships.  Statistics About Business Size from the 
Census Bureau, CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
 21. See KENNETH A. KIM & JOHN R. NOFSINGER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2004). 
 22. See Gretchen Morgonson, He Doesn’t Let Money Managers Off the Hook, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/business/12gret.html. 
 23. See BASAL COMMITTEE, ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1999, supra note 
15.   
 24. These include PRINCIPLES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF INTEREST RATE RISK (1997), 
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (1998), 
ENHANCING BANK TRANSPARENCY (1998), and PRINCIPLES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT 
RISK (1999). 
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In the conventional Anglo–American system of corporate governance, 
the main objective of the company is to make a profit and increase 
shareholder wealth.  In other words, it is the interest of the shareholders 
which the managers and directors of the corporation should be looking out 
for.  In this paradigm, the “exclusive focus of corporate governance should 
be to maximize shareholder value.”25  The Franco–German model of 
corporate governance, or what has been also termed the European bank-
based system of governance, looks at a broader base of what has been 
termed “stakeholders” to include employees, lenders, customers and 
vendors, among others.26  So in this latter paradigm, management is 
concerned with protecting the interests of a much broader base of 
stakeholders than in the Anglo–American model.  This at times gives rise to 
conflicts, since there will be times when the interests of such a diffuse group 
will clash.  The manager is faced with a whom–do–you–protect–first 
dilemma in such an event. 
Generally—at least in the Anglo–Saxon model—owners of a 
corporation, the shareholders, wish to increase their wealth.  They are 
familiar with the old maxim “the more the risk, the more the reward,” and 
so often owners will wish that the managers take certain risks in order to 
reap more rewards.  A non–shareholder manager often has no incentive to 
take risk, since he or she knows that if the enterprise fails, he or she will 
have no job.  This is where the alignment of shareholder interest with 
manager’s interest comes in by providing incentives that align the 
manager’s rewards with the shareholders’ interests.  Stock awards and stock 
options, and sometimes bonuses, do just that. 
Lenders, on the other hand, have no such interest; lenders do not wish 
the corporate borrower to take risk.  The lender wants to be assured that its 
loan will be repaid.  Loan covenants are a means by which lenders have a 
very strong influence on the governance of their corporate borrowers.  In 
this sense, banks are themselves important elements of the governance of 
corporations in the places in which they operate. 
I. THE GOVERNANCE OF CONVENTIONAL BANKS 
Banks are an essential cog in the wheel of commerce in any society.  
Banks differ markedly from general corporations insofar as governance 
needs are concerned:  
Banks Matter.  When banks efficiently mobilize and allocate funds, they 
lower the cost of capital to firms and accelerate capital accumulation.  
  
 25. Jonathon R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 
ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 95 (2003). 
 26. See generally JONATHON CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES (1994); see also Perry & Rehman, supra note 
9. 
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When banks allocate credit to entrepreneurs with the best ideas (rather 
than to those with the most accumulated wealth or strongest political 
connections) productivity growth is boosted and more people can pursue 
their economic dreams.  And, when banks manage risk prudently, the 
likelihood of systemic crises is reduced.27   
Others have said that “when banks efficiently mobilize and allocate funds, 
this lowers the cost of capital to firms, boosts capital formation, and 
stimulates productivity growth.  So, weak governance of banks reverberates 
throughout the economy with negative ramifications for economic 
development.”28 The corporate and financial structures of banks differ from 
the typical corporation.  Banks are opaque; it is hard to determine where 
exactly the money is and how much risk is covering the funds out on loan.  
Opacity makes monitoring for governance purposes difficult.  The relative 
risk of loans outstanding on a bank’s balance sheet is difficult to determine 
simply by looking at the balance sheet. 
A second problem is regulation.29  This may seem counterintuitive, since 
many would say that the regulation of banks is a good thing as it protects 
banks, their shareholders, and their depositors.  But regulation may have the 
opposite effect.  As mentioned above, in the typical corporate scenario, an 
outside lender has an ameliorating effect on shareholders’ propensity to take 
risks—with the lender’s money.  With a bank, the depositor is, in effect, a 
lender to the bank.  But such lenders take no interest in the governance of 
the bank or in the level of risk that it runs in its operations.  Generally the 
depositor/lender does not require more or less interest be paid to him or her 
on the deposit dependent on the level of risk the bank runs.  So the “debt 
holders” do not share in the upside potential, no matter the level of risk.  In 
fact, because depositors feel comfortable that the government will protect 
their “loan” to the bank, they take no interest whatsoever in the bank’s 
practices.  Some studies have shown that government regulations generally 
have an adverse impact on the governance of banks.30  It has been suggested 
that such regulation often encourages low capital–asset ratios.31  It has even 
been argued that banking regulation brought about the destruction of AIG.32 
As a practical matter, the stakeholders in the typical bank, even in those 
countries where the Anglo–American model of corporate governance 
prevails, are multiplied.  The bank not only has the owners, that is, the 
  
 27. Laeven & Levine, supra note 10. 
 28. Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of 
Concepts and Issues (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3404, 2004). 
 29. See generally Andrea Polo, Corporate Governance of Banks: The Current State 
of the Debate (MPRA Paper No. 2325, Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muennchen.de/2325/.  
 30. See Levine, supra note 29.   
 31. Polo, supra note 30, at 5. 
 32. John Carney, How Bank Regulation Destroyed AIG, THE BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 2, 
2009), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-bank-regulation-helped-destroy-aig-2009-3. 
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shareholders, but there are depositors and society in general, which depend 
on the viability of its banks for its economy to run smoothly.  So banks 
should be looking out for a variety of interests.  It is questionable whether 
they actually do.  Lest anyone continue to say that the interest and profit of 
shareholders—the only relevant stakeholders—and their say in management 
and governance in the Anglo–Saxon model is the way the truth and the 
light, one need only look at who has bailed them out and where the money 
came from for that bailout:  the governments and the taxpayers.  So for 
financial institutions at least, many stakeholders abound, even in the Anglo–
Saxon model. 
Concerned over renewed problems in the international commercial world 
and the ethical and other failures in the governance systems of companies 
around the world, and mindful of the fact that certain banking structures 
around the world lack transparency and that many banks exist in 
jurisdictions that purposefully impede information flows, the Basel 
Committee issued a revision to its 1999 guidance in 2006.33  That revision 
set forth eight principles by which sound banks were to be governed.34  This 
system presupposed that the governance systems would ensure that the 
banks in question would adhere to the guidelines respecting such things as 
  
 33. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS 3 (Feb. 2006), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.pdf. 
 34. Those principles are: 
Principle 1: Board members should be qualified for their positions, 
have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance and 
be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank. 
Principle 2: The board of directors should approve and oversee the 
bank’s strategic objectives and corporate values that are 
communicated throughout the banking organisation. 
Principle 3: The board of directors should set and enforce clear lines 
of responsibility and accountability throughout the organisation. 
Principle 4: The board should ensure that there is appropriate 
oversight by senior management consistent with board policy. 
Principle 5: The board and senior management should effectively 
utilise the work conducted by the internal audit function, external 
auditors, and internal control functions. 
Principle 6: The board should ensure that compensation policies and 
practices are consistent with the bank’s corporate culture, long-term 
objectives and strategy, and control environment. 
Principle 7: The bank should be governed in a transparent manner. 
Principle 8: The board and senior management should understand the 
bank’s operational structure, including where the bank operates in 
jurisdictions, or through structures, that impede transparency (i.e. 
“know-your-structure”).   
Id. 
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the management of interest rate risk, the management of credit risk, 
transparency and internal controls systems. 
Even so, there has not been an intense scrutiny and push for enhanced 
corporate governance in banks, at least not in the U.S., where some of the 
world’s largest banks are headquartered.35 
In the U.S. there are some problems going forward even after the 
financial debacle and the infusion of billions of dollars in the banking 
system by the U.S. government.  Compensation and risk taking, according 
to some governance experts, have not been curbed, despite the rhetoric of 
the U.S. Congress and the infusion of billions of dollars.  For example, 
directors have been left in place—those same directors who allowed the 
problems to arise in the first place—and compensation levels that encourage 
risk–taking are not really controlled in a meaningful way.36  The British, in 
their bailout program, have at least replaced a number of directors.37   
The corporate governance of the typical US bank is shown in the 
following diagram: 
 
Diagram 1.1  





 35. Macey & O’Hara, supra note 26. 
 36. See Alistair Barr, Corporate Governance Takes Back Seat in Bank Bailouts, 
RISKMETRICS GROUP (Oct. 17, 2008), 
http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/articles/20081017_djn.html. 
 37. Id. 
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II. THE GOVERNANCE OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
Islamic banks are governed differently than Anglo–American banks.  In 
order to understand how and why they are different, it is first necessary to 
understand a modicum of Islamic law, since the law, as Muslims define it, is 
the normative basis and indeed the reason for the existence of Islamic 
banking.   
The source of the law and the definition of law are different between the 
typical Western legal tradition and that of Islam.  Even though some highly 
regarded U.S. practitioners have suggested that to ask “what is law” is a 
meaningless question,38 in most industrialized countries—and certainly in 
the United States—law is considered to be “a body of rules of action or 
conduct prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force.  
That which must be obeyed and followed by citizens subject to sanction or 
legal consequence . . . .”39  The Mexican jurist defines law as a norm or rule 
that sets the limits of human conduct, in order to settle social conflict, and to 
which all people must forcibly subject themselves.40  Another Western, civil 
law example is the Mexican Constitution, which states that all the 
resolutions of the Congress will be considered law.41  In the United States, 
the source of all law is the Constitution of the United States, and its source 
is the people.42  The Constitution gives authority to the Congress to make 
the laws, and the Congress is also elected by “the People of the several 
States.”43  In a typical civil law country, such as Mexico, law is considered 
as “emanating from legitimate authority.”44 
Islamic law is different, and Muslims believe differently.  Since in the 
West the lawgiver is man and the institutions of man, the law can be 
changed by man.  But for Muslims “[t]he absolute knowledge which is 
required to lay down a path for human life is not possessed by any group of 
people.”45  For Shari’ah, which is the Muslim concept of law, God is the 
  
 38. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987, 100 HARV. L.REV. 761, 765 (1987). 
 39. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Co., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  The foregoing is a 
definition from a Common Law jurisdiction, and in practice, that definition fairly represents 
the operation of “law” in most industrialized countries.  However  the Civil Law tradition, 
which often deals with such subjects from both a broader and more theoretical approach, 
defines law as;  “A rule of conduct . . . (which is) . . . the combination of rules that govern 
social relations.”  Eugine Petit, 21 DERECHO ROMANO 15 (2005).  See also Charles Louis de 
Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, Del Espiritu de las Leyes, Editorial Porrúa, 
México, Capítulo Primero (1992).  Of course in this tradition, there is a distinction between 
droit and loi, or derecho and ley, which distinction is not easy to translate into English, but 
the Common Law concept and word law is broad enough to cover them.   
 40. TRINIDAD GARCIA, APUNTES DE INTRODUCCIÓN AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO (1978). 
 41. I RAFAEL DE PINA, DERECHO CIVIL MEXICANO 92 (11th ed. 1981). 
 42. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art I, §2. 
 44. De Pina, supra note 42, at 44. 
 45. ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOI, SHARI’AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 2 (5th ed. 1984).  
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lawgiver, and no one—no power on earth—has the authority to change the 
law.46  The source of Islamic law is the Qur’an, considered by Muslims to 
be the holy word of God, and the Sunna, the sayings and way of life of the 
Prophet Mohammed.47 
Shari’ah, or the law for Muslims, is an all-encompassing set of concepts 
and rules that govern nearly every aspect of daily life, including the laws of 
contract and commerce; in light of this, according to most legal and 
religious scholars, Islamic law is divinely inspired and revealed, and 
therefore not given to changes by man—as are the laws in the other two 
traditions.48  The other two legal traditions, which govern most of the 
world’s citizens and its commerce, are what are known as the Common Law 
tradition and the Civil Law tradition.49  The laws in both a Civil Law society 
and a Common Law society are made by human beings, and therefore are 
changeable by them.  This is not so in divinely revealed Shari’ah, the 
revelation of which has been interpreted to some extent, but not changed.50  
This can be problematic in finance law since we need to bridge the gap of 
one thousand years of jurisprudential development to meet today’s modern 
financial needs.  At about 1000 A.D., the Ulema declared that enough 
interpretation had taken place, and most schools of Islamic law did not 
develop their jurisprudence any further51 despite radical changes in other 
societies thereafter.  In contrast, Western systems of law change with 
society’s changing circumstances. 
Even though the first bank to use Islamic concepts can be traced to Egypt 
in 1963, the truly modern idea of an Islamic bank and Islamic banking 
industry was raised at the Islamic Summit in Lahore, Pakistan in 1975.52   
  
 46. DAVID M. NEIPERT, LAW OF GLOBAL COMMERCE 27 (2002). 
 47. RAHMAN, supra note 46, at chs. 2-4.   
 48. SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, IDEALS AND REALITIES OF ISLAM 86 (KAZI Publications 
2000) (1966).  Rafei, supra note 8.   
 49. Siegfried H. Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law and Civil 
Law Divide in Arbitration, 18 ARBITRATION INT’L 1, 1.  For a list of countries governed by 
the common law tradition, see Common Law, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 21, 2010, 10:46 AM), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law (“The common law constitutes the basis of the 
legal systems of: England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Ireland, federal law in the United 
States and the law of individual U.S. States (except Louisiana), federal law throughout 
Canada and the law of the individual provinces and territories (except Quebec), Australia 
(both federal and individual states), Kenya, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Malaysia, 
Brunei, Pakistan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and many other generally English-speaking 
countries or Commonwealth countries (except Scotland, which is bijuridicial, and Malta). 
Essentially, every country that was colonised at some time by England, Great Britain, or the 
United Kingdom uses common law” with few exceptions.  “The main alternative to the 
common law system is the civil law system, which is used in Continental Europe, and most 
of the rest of the world.”).   
 50. Frederick V. Perry, Shari’ah Islamic Law and Arab Business Ethics, 22 CONN. 
J.INT’L L. 357, 368 (2007). 
 51. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW ch. 10 (1982).  
 52. Id. 
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Banking in the Arab world has traditionally been identified with the 
colonial powers, and freedom from colonial rule sparked an interest in a 
return to the culture and customs of the people—that is, to Islam.  
Oppression would, it was believed, be eliminated through the fairness and 
justice that Islam espoused.  Locally owned banks did not start in the Arab 
world until the 1920’s.53  The Western banking system was seen as an 
instrument of Western corruption and exploitation; so for the people to have 
confidence in the banking system that was to be home grown, it had to be 
based on Islamic principles and not Western principles.54  Banking activities 
were to be associated with the tenets espoused by the Prophet Mohammed 
and the Qur’an.  Commercial ventures, borrowing, and lending therefore 
could all be associated with acts of piety.  But for this to happen, people had 
to be assured that what the banks were doing actually was sanctioned by 
Shari’ah.   
The banks, which started proliferating in the Middle East in the 1970’s, 
covered this requirement by using Shari’ah boards to “bless” their activities 
and their financial instruments.  The idea was that since Islamic banks were 
new, they must submit all new types of transaction to a “Shari’ah 
committee” in order to ensure that they conformed with Islamic principles.55 
It was essential that the expectations of the Muslim community be met56 in 
order to give the banks legitimacy.  An Islamic organization must serve 
God, and “act within the framework of an Islamic formula, so that any 
person approaching an Islamic bank should be given the impression that he 
is entering a sacred place to perform a religious ritual, that is the use and 
employment of capital for what is acceptable and satisfactory to God.”57  
There has been a broad interest in the use and function of the Shari’ah 
boards, since it is believed that compliance with Shari’ah is the raison 
d’être of the Islamic financial services industry.58  Indeed “the core mission 
of an Islamic financial institution is to meet its stakeholders’ desire to 
conduct their financial business according to Shari’ah principles.”59 
  
 53. Eur. Inst. on Res. on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, Islamic Banks,  
MEDEA.BE (Mar. 2000), http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=28 
[hereinafter Islamic Banks]. 
 54. See Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Shariah, Economics and the Progress of 
Islamic Finance: The Role of Shariah Experts  (Concept paper presented to the Seventh 
Harvard Forum on Islamic Finance, Apr. 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.siddiqi.com/mns/Role_of_Shariah_Experts.htm [hereinafter Siddiqi, Finance]. 
 55. Islamic Banks, supra note 54. 
 56. Sulieman, supra note 8. 
 57. A. L. Janahi, ISLAMIC BANKING: CONCEPT, PRACTICE AND FUTURE 42 (2d ed. 
1995). 
 58. ISLAMIC FIN. SERVS. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON SHARI’AH 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 1 (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter EXPOSURE DRAFT].   
 59. Wafik Grais & Matteo Pellegrini, Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services: Issues and Options 6 (World Bank Research Working Paper 
4052, 2006). 
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Just like a modern day Catholic may turn to her priest to answer certain 
questions about her religion, Muslims turn to experts also when interpreting 
their religion and in order to answer certain wooly questions; they turn to 
the scholars—the Ulema.60 The word Ulema is the plural form of the Arabic 
Alim, and means a learned man or scholar.61  Such men are learned in 
Shari’ah and all aspects of Muslim traditions, are knowledgeable in divine 
law, and serve as its guardians and interpreters.  They are the closest thing 
to a priest that the religion has, but they are not priests, and they do not rule 
over Islamic society (aside from the exception of Iran after the revolution of 
1979).62 
In order to fill this need for legitimizing Islamic banking, the bankers 
invented the concept of the Shari’ah board, made up of Ulema who could 
interpret and evaluate the operations and transactions of the bank.63  All new 
ways of doing business and new types of transactions— including 
contracts—are submitted to the Shari’ah board for scrutiny and approval.64  
A.  Islamic Banking Law 
Islam looks at wealth as something to be used efficiently to sustain life;65 
and justice and fairness for all concerned are the theoretical and religious 
basis for the institution of Islamic finance.66 The idea is to ensure the 
equitable distribution of wealth, so that wealth does not simply circulate 
among only the wealthy.67  Shari’ah prohibits the charging of interest.68  
Many in the West are not unfamiliar with the prohibition of interest, but in 
Islamic banking there are four other important elements.  Essentially there 
are five basic principles of Islamic Banking:  
  
 60. RAHMAN, supra note 46 at 5-6.    
 61. 2 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM 438-39 (1974) (explaining 
that the word Ulema is the plural form of the Arabic Alim, and means a learned man or 
scholar, and such men are learned in Shari'ah and all aspects of the Muslim traditions). 
 62. SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, THE HEART OF ISLAM: ENDURING VALUES FOR HUMANITY 
148 (2002). 
 63. See Siddiqi, Finance, supra note 55.  
 64. See id. 
 65. Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, The Foundation of Islamic Finance, Lecture 
Delivered at the Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA (Oct. 25, 2001), 
available at http://www.siddiqi.com/mns/Lecture1.htm [hereinafter Siddiqi, Finance 
Lecture].  
 66. Mohammed Nejatullah Siddiqi, Recent History of Islamic Banking and Finance, 
Lecture Delivered at the Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA (Nov. 7, 2001), 
available at http://www.siddiqi.com/mns/Lecture2.htm. 
 67. Hasan Zubair, Islamic Finance Education at Graduate Level: Current Position 
and Challenge, 5 (MPRA Paper No. 8712, May 2008), available at mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/8712/. 
 68. Id. at 12. 
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1) In a loan any predetermined payment over and above the actual   
amount of principal is prohibited, that is, no interest. 
2) Arising from the interest prohibition, the lender must share in the 
profits or losses arising out of the enterprise for which the money was lent.  
3) Making money from money is not acceptable, as money has no 
intrinsic value.  
4) Gharar (uncertainty, risk or speculation) and the related Maysir 
(gambling, bets and wager) are also prohibited69 
5) Investments can only support practices or products that are not 
forbidden (alcohol, pornography, investment in real estate for a casino, etc. 
are forbidden). 70 
B.  Prohibition of Interest 
The reason set forth in the Qur’an and Shari’ah for the prohibition of 
interest is that the depositor (or the lender) should not profit unduly from the 
hard work and risk bearing of others.  Although Islam prohibits interest, it 
encourages profit and return from investment where the investor takes a 
calculated risk; commerce and trade are encouraged,71  so banks can give an 
investor a share of their annual profits (and losses) in proportion to the 
investor’s (depositor’s) deposit based on the share of an individual’s deposit 
in relation to total assets of the bank being lent out.  
This rate of return to the investor is different from interest in two 
important ways: the amount to be paid is not known at the outset of the 
transaction (there are no guarantees as to amount of return), and the investor 
(read lender or depositor) has to accept more risk.  On the other hand, as an 
example, the depositor in the conventional western bank takes less of a risk 
because the bank’s capital (that is, the capital investment of the stockholders 
of the bank) is first at risk before the capital of the depositors.  
Because of the foregoing, equity participation and profit and loss sharing 
are the basis of Islamic banking.  Such banks do not charge interest; rather 
they participate in the profits arising from the use of lent funds.  The 
depositors also share in the profits arising from the use by the bank of their 
funds in lending activities based on a predetermined ratio.  However, in the 
event of losses (for certain types of deposits, as will be explained), the 
depositor also loses a proportional share of his or her funds on deposit.  The 
bank also is arguably more at risk than is a conventional Western bank, 
  
 69. But see infra note 123. 
 70. See Sulieman, supra note 8; Mohammad Netjatullah Siddiqi, The Wisdom of 
Prohibition of Interest, Lecture at LaRiba Annual Meeting at Los Angeles (Mar. 30, 2002); 
Siddiqi, Finance Lecture, supra note 66.    
 71. Qur'an 4:32. 
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since the bank cannot require a guarantee or security in the form of 
collateral to cover a potential loss in the event of default on repayment.  
Theoretically, the liability of the borrowing entrepreneur is limited to their 
ability to repay based on success of the enterprise, absent negligence or 
mismanagement, in which case the borrower can be liable for repaying the 
lender’s financial loss.72   
The source and use of funds are a bit different with Islamic banks. 
Reserves are fractioned; that is, deposits are not simply mingled and place 
wherever the banks wish.  Not all depositor accounts are used by the bank 
for the same purpose.  Some are used for financial investments and 
commercial loans, and some are not; it depends on the type of deposit 
account.  Further, some deposit accounts give the depositor the claim to the 
full amount of the deposit, along with a premium payment or an amount 
based on the bank’s earnings.  The deposit of funds into an investment 
deposit account allows the bank to use the funds in a long term loan.  The 
depositor may lose some or all of his funds if the bank incurs losses; 
however, the returns to the depositor—if there are returns—are normally 
higher.73  Rather than a depositor earning a fixed rate of interest as in 
conventional western banks, the depositor only earns money if she subjects 
herself to the same risk that the bank undergoes, and thus receives only a 
share in the profits.74 
In sum, Shari’ah and Islam in general seek economic fairness and justice; 
in fact, Muslims are commanded to seek justice and fairness.75  A loan from 
a conventional Western bank requires repayment no matter the outcome of 
the business venture of the borrower, but Islam considers this unfair—ergo 
the prohibition of interest—and a sharing in the profit and loss is considered 
to be fairer, more legitimate, and thus this principle is the basis for Islamic 
banking.76 
C.  The Governance of Islamic Banks 
Islamic banks are typically organized as corporations under the laws of 
their jurisdictions of incorporation.  Those laws differ from place to place in 
their vision of the relationships among the stakeholders and the role that the 
corporation is to play in society,77 but they all have a governance system, 
  
 72. See Sulieman, supra note 8. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Examples are Qur'an 57:25, 16:90 and 7:29; this is the theme found throughout 
the Qur'an. 
 76. Sulieman, supra note 8. 
 77. See Scheherazade Rehman & Frederick V. Perry, Globalization and its Effects on 
the Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems?, 17 J. GLOBAL BUS. 5 (2006).  See also 
Larry A. DiMatteo & Lucien J. Dhooge, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW:  A TRANSACTIONAL 
APPROACH ch. 3 (2d ed. 2006). 
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varied though it may be, which conforms to the commercial laws and 
customs of the jurisdiction in question.  So it is that the typical 
corporation—for example, in the case of a bank under the Anglo–Saxon 
model—has both an internal and an external governance system.  The 
external system is made up of the stock exchange rules, the corporation or 
company laws of the jurisdiction, and any central bank regulatory authority 
and lenders, who require certain restrictive covenants in their loan 
documents.  On the other hand, the Islamic bank has a more complex 
governance system. 
It must be remembered that in the Franco–German model of the 
corporation, there are a variety of stakeholders in addition to the 
shareholders whose interests are looked after in the running of the 
corporation, and in countries like Germany, there is a two-tiered board of 
directors.78  In this sense, the Islamic bank is similar to the German 
corporation in its governance model.  In essence it has two boards: the one 
required by secular law, and the one required by religious law.  So the 
Islamic bank has to comply with the laws of man and the laws of God at the 
same time.  This is not always easy, since it also has to compete within the 
marketplace.   
The Islamic bank has at least one further outside governance body: the 
Islamic Accounting Standards Board, also known as the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).79  The 
  
 78. CHARKHAM, supra note 27, at 14.   
 79. The AAOIFI website provides: 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) is an Islamic international autonomous not-
for-profit corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, 
governance, ethics and Shari'a standards for Islamic financial 
institutions and the industry. Professional qualification programs 
(notably CIPA, the Shari’a Adviser and Auditor "CSAA", and the 
corporate compliance program) are presented now by AAOIFI in its 
efforts to enhance the industry’s human resources base and 
governance structures. 
AAOIFI was established in accordance with the Agreement of 
Association, which was signed by Islamic financial institutions on 1 
Safar, 1410H, corresponding to 26 February 1990, in Algiers. Then, 
it was registered on 11 Ramadan 1411, corresponding to 27 March 
1991, in the State of Bahrain. 
As an independent, international organization, AAOIFI is supported 
by institutional members (155 members from 40 countries, so far) 
including central banks, Islamic financial institutions, and other 
worldwide participants from the international Islamic banking and 
finance industry.  
AAOIFI has gained assuring support for the implementation of its 
standards, which are now adopted in the Kingdom of Bahrain, Dubai 
International Financial Centre, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan and 
Syria. The relevant authorities in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
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AAOFI develops, recommends, and promulgates accounting standards for 
Islamic banks, and while its standards do not generally have the effect of 
being rules of law or having sanctions for their transgression, they have 
been adopted by many Muslim and Western countries, and for a bank to 
state that it adheres to them is good for its reputation and provides yet 
another measure of comfort for the bank’s customers. 
In addition to the outside regulators, however, the internal regulators are 
multiplied for the Islamic bank.  First, there are the two boards: the one 
required by law and the one “required” by God.  Then there are, of course, 
the shareholders.  In addition, the depositors are stakeholders; they share in 
the profits and losses of the bank’s operation.  The borrowers are also 
stakeholders, since the bank is in essence a partner with the borrower in the 
borrower’s business ventures.   
The Shari’ah board and its use can give rise to a number of thorny issues 
for the bank.  The members of the Shari’ah board are supposed to be 
objective outsiders who make their decisions in consultation with the other 
Shari’ah board members, but in a way that is to be unbiased by any financial 
or other interests respecting the bank or the transaction. 
An Islamic bank has its Shari’ah board, which is supposed to be external 
and independent (though its members are paid by the bank), revising 
policies and documents, but answerable only to themselves and God.  
Additionally, the bank will often, and usually does, have an internal 
Shari’ah compliance person or committee,80 whose job it is to ensure that 
the bank complies with that which the Shari’ah board has mandated through 
its fatwas.81 
The Islamic Financial Services Board82 is working toward better gover-
nance in Islamic banking.  In a speech before the meeting of the Arab Bank-
  
Pakistan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and South Africa have issued 
guidelines that are based on AAOIFI’s standards and 
pronouncements.  
AAOIFI Overview, THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, http://www.aaoifi.com/overview.html (last visited Nov. 
6, 2010).  
 80. One is recommended by the Islamic Financial Services Board in the GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON SHARI’AH GOVERNANCE SYSTEM.  EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 59, at 2. 
 81. A fatwa is the considered legal opinion of a mufti; an expert on Shari’ah. JOSEPH 
SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 73 (1982). 
 82. The Islamic Financial Services Board based in Kuala Lumpur, was officially 
inaugurated on 3 November 2002 and started operations on 10 March 2003, and states on its 
website:  
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) is an international 
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soundness and stability of the Islamic financial services industry by 
issuing global prudential standards and guiding principles for the 
industry, broadly defined to include banking, capital markets and 
insurance sectors. The IFSB also conducts research and coordinates 
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ing Association of North America, the executive vice president in charge of 
the Bank Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 
a member of the Bank’s Management Committee commented that: 
To this end, institutions like the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions and the Islamic Financial Services Board 
[IFSB] are serving a critical function . . . the IFSB recently released 
exposure drafts of capital adequacy and risk management standards for 
Islamic financial institutions.  These standards will help regulators both in 
countries that already have well–developed Islamic financial systems and 
in Western countries, to understand and supervise Islamic finance . . . [the 
IFSB] is also working to strengthen the corporate governance framework 
for the Islamic financial services industry, and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York . . . [involvement to date has been its via in the 2007 IFSB–
sponsored summit on Islamic finance] . . . of course, corporate governance 
issues and compliance have become particularly important . . . [to the Fed 
over the past few years] . . . and some of the approaches [the Fed] has 
taken to address this issue already have much in common with the 
practices of Islamic finance.83 
The IFSB has issued a set of principles on corporate governance for 
Islamic banks,84 as has the AAOIFI.85 In fact, the AAOFFI has commenced 
a training program to educate the market and practitioners about its 
standards.86   Other organizations have been formed to standardize the 
  
initiatives on industry related issues, as well as organises 
roundtables, seminars and conferences for regulators and industry 
stakeholders.  
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD, http://www.ifsb.org (last visited Nov. 6, 
2010). 
 83. William L. Rutledge, Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banking in the 
United State, Remarks at the 2004 Arab Banking Association of North American (ABANA) 
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New York City (Apr. 15, 2005), available at 
https://abanaboard.bluestep.net/download/123321_U127360__71877/Rutledge%20Presentati
on.pdf.  Mr. Rutledge was a member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision from 
1999 through 2004.  William L. Rutledge, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 
http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/orgchart/rutledge.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
 84. ISLAMIC FIN. SERVICES, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR 
INSTITUTIONS OFFERING ONLY ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES (EXCLUDING ISLAMIC INSURANCE 
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Standards” (for Islamic Financial Institutions) in 2008.  See AAOIFI Overview, supra note 
80. 
 86. The AAOIFI has training programs on Certified Shari’ah Advisor and Auditor, 
and Certified Islamic Professional Accountant.  AAOIFI, THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
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system, such as the International Islamic Rating Agency, the International 
Islamic Financial Market and the Liquidity Management Center.  None have 
the force of law.  While the IFSB principles do call for a variety of 
measures to strengthen the governance of Islamic banks, they do not really 
push in a meaningful way for global standardization; rather, they take the 
view that “there is no single model of corporate governance that can work 
well in every country.”  These principles go on to say that “[a]ny rigid, rule 
based approach adopted in haste with the aim of strengthening the corporate 
governance of [Islamic banks] may hinder their potential and healthy 
growth.”87  These principles accept the principles promoted by the OECD,88 
and the Basel Committee’s “Enhancing Corporate Governance of Banking 
Institutions.”  This may be unfortunate, since those companies complying 
with the OECD principles are a varied group of all sorts of companies, and 
global standardization is not essential for their ability to interact and 
compete.  Financial transactions are different, and do require more 
standardization.  According to the Basel Committee:  
Implementation of the Basel II Framework continues to move forward 
around the globe.  A significant number of countries and banks already 
implemented the standardized and foundation approaches as of the 
beginning of this year.  In many other jurisdictions, the necessary 
infrastructure (legislation, regulation, supervisory guidance, etc) to 
implement the Framework is either in place or in process, which will allow 
a growing number of countries to proceed with implementation of Basel 
II’s advanced approaches in 2008 and 2009.89  
But the original Basel Capital Accord introduced by the Basel 
Committee in 1998 has been introduced in “virtually all countries with 
internationally active banks.”90 Banks are not as dissimilar as industrial 
corporations are dissimilar, and the conventional Western style banks of the 
world are attempting to comply with the Basel standards—as opposed to the 
more loose OECD standards.  Thus, a conventional loan in Mexico City, 
New York, Paris or London is fairly uniform.  On the other hand, the 
financial instruments and offerings used by Islamic banks around the world 
are quite dissimilar, as will be discussed below. 
Given all this, if asked, most Muslim financiers appear to say that the 
Islamic controls provide for a more regulated, less risky, user friendly, 
  
 87. See Rutledge, supra note 84. 
 88. OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 14. 
 89. Progress on Basel II Implementation, New Works Streams and Outreach, BASEL 
COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), May 2007, available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_nl11.htm. 
 90. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE 
AND ITS MEMBERSHIP (Aug. 2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf. 
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community friendly, ethical way of doing business91 and they believe that 
any effects of the current crisis on Islamic banks will be limited.92  Many 
Muslims believe that their system has the answer.  The Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, in speaking about the current world–wide crisis, stated in a 
conference on Islamic banking that:  
We have inherited a system where people can trade what they do not own 
and the resulting inflationary pressure in the global market has caused 
immense damage to the economic well–being of the world’s poor . . . .  
Such is the impact of unbridled greed in the financial system where there 
is no accountability on money lending . . . .  The world is beginning to 
appreciate the need for alternative financial arrangements.93 
In March of 2009, “Muslim presidents, prime ministers and prince[s] . . . 
. called on the world to adopt Islamic financial practices to overcome the 
global crisis and urged Islamic banks to undertake ‘missionary work’  in the 
west to promote Shariah banking.”94 
D.  Standardization 
While Muslims may feel confident that the bank they go to adheres to 
Islamic principles, it appears that those principles are not uniformly defined, 
and that banks and their Shari’ah boards differ in their interpretations of 
Islamic principles.  This makes for difficulties in cross–border banking 
activities and a truly globalized system of Islamic banking and finance.  
Many are calling for standardization.  John B. Taylor, a former Under 
Secretary for International Affairs of the U.S. Treasury Department, in 
discussing Islamic banking,  has said that “[t]here needs to be some level of 
consistency in regulatory treatment across the board . . .”95  However, with 
  
 91. Rafei, supra note 8; Islamic Finance Sector Resilient, supra note 3; Adnan Yusuf: 
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http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=6&id=14245. 
 93. Rafei, supra note 8. 
 94. John Aglionby, Islamic Banks Urged to Show the Way, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, 
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for “Understanding and Supporting Islamic Finance.”). 
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the growth of and proliferation of Islamic banks, efforts at standardization 
have become even more difficult.96  
There are some problems respecting standardization.  The IFSB and 
Basel II are attempting to nudge banks in the direction of standardized 
practices, but a major stumbling block to the development of an 
internationally accepted Islamic banking industry is the lack of broadly 
accepted standards.  The Shari’ah board of an Islamic bank in Malaysia may 
approve a financial product, and that same product may not be acceptable or 
approved in a country within the Gulf Cooperation Council.97 Some 
countries set up Shari’ah compliance and Shari’ah boards at the national 
level.  Malaysia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Iran have set up Shari’ah boards for 
approving banking standards at the level of the central bank.  In most other 
countries, the finance industry appoints its own Shari’ah board,98 which in 
many cases is at the institutional level; that is, within each bank or finance 
house.  This gives rise to a variety of different interpretations.  Khaled 
Yousaf, head of business development in the Islamic finance sector of the 
Dubai International Finance Center, states that “Egypt and Malaysia have 
very liberal interpretations of Shari’ah law, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
are quite strict.  Dubai is somewhere in the middle.”99   
Moreover, there is the lack of trained Islamic legal scholars with 
knowledge of the world of finance to become members of banks’ Shari’ah 
boards.  This can prove to be a disadvantage for the industry.100 
Additionally, there do not appear to be enough trained business people and 
economists who understand the Islamic financial industry to man the 
banks.101 
For a Western trained banker, the term “standardization” is fairly 
common and easy to understand.  This is not so easy for proponents of 
Shari’ah law.  Religious views are not easily changed or compromised.  In 
addition to the varying level of conservatism versus liberalism regarding 
Islam in the various Islamic countries, the matter is further complicated by 
the fact that there are four main schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and 
one Shi’a school.102  Accordingly, “the lack of clarity in Shari’ah practices 
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 98. Gordon Platt, Profits With Principle, GLOBAL FIN., July/Aug. 2006, 
http://www.gfmag.com/archives/51-51-july-2006/1355-cover-story-profits-with-
principles.html#axzz137eVx6Z2. 
 99. Id. 
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leads to lower mobility of these practices within the same country and 
across borders, which handicaps the growth of the industry.”103 
Some Islamic scholars are now espousing a supreme Shari’ah board that 
will oversee all Shari’ah boards and which will bear responsibility for 
supervising the activities and the fatwas of all other boards.104  In fact, 
Indonesia, the most populous Muslim nation, has set up such a “super” 
Shari’ah board.  The Indonesian Council of Ulema has set up a National 
Shari’ah Board, which issues fatwas that are binding on the other Shari’ah 
boards.  And under this system, the board members of the individual banks 
must be highly qualified in order to be able fully to understand the fatwas 
and to be able to draft and approve contracts that comply with such 
fatwas.105  
On an international basis, it appears that both the regulators of banks and 
the Shari’ah scholars agree that the Shari’ah standards and the methods of 
their interpretation and application must be standardized, especially if the 
Islamic Banking system really wants to grow in an international way and 
wants to appeal to a broad array of international commercial capital 
consumers.  But it is also clear that this will require close cooperation and 
collaboration among the interested parties.106  This does not appear to be an 
easy task.  Despite a lot of vocal chords being exercised and ink being 
spilled on the matter, no one has to date clearly and fully defined the term 
“Shari’ah Governance System.”107   
To that end—and in order to strengthen and standardize the Islamic 
financial services industry—the Islamic Financial Services Board, in a 
meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, promulgated an exposure draft on Guiding 
Principles on Shari’ah Governance System and requested comments on that 
draft to be sent in by May 15, 2009.108  This document goes a long way in an 
attempt to standardize the industry; however, even when it is finally agreed 
upon, it is unlikely to be anything more than a set of guiding principles, 
with no real sanctions for non–compliance.  In fact, other international 
institutions have issued their own guidelines regarding Shari’ah 
governance.109  One area of interest for the IFSB is that of the 
professionalism of the members of the Shari’ah boards.   
As noted above, and according to the IFSB, the word “scholar” in the 
context of Islam refers to a translation of the Arabic alim, the plural of 
ulema, which are people who are learned and expert in the study of the 
  
school.  RAHMAN, supra note 46, at ch. 5.  See also LALEH BAKHTIAR, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
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 103. Zaaidi, supra note 5, at 3. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
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 106. Id. at 5. 
 107. EXPOSURE DRAFT., supra note 59. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at n.4. 
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Qur’an and Islam.  However, when the IFSB use the term “Shari’ah 
Scholar,” they refer to a more specialized person, someone who is an expert 
in commercial law in the Islamic context—as opposed to someone who is 
simply well versed in Islamic studies.  On Shari’ah boards, the IFSB wants 
people who, more specifically, are specialized in providing expert opinions 
and resolutions related to Islamic financial services.  They want 
professionals as opposed to merely academics.  Accordingly, the IFSB 
prefers the term “Shari’ah Board” as opposed to “Shari’ah Scholars” in 
referring to the phenomenon of using Islamic legal experts in the 
administration of Islamic banks and banking instruments.110  Of utmost 
importance to the IFSB is the independence of the Shari’ah Board.111   
Ideally, according to the IFSB, the Shari’ah Board should have at least 
three members; it would be good if they were of different nationalities or at 
least trained in different schools of Islamic law, and they “should possess 
some exposure in the areas of commerce or finance . . . .”112 
The IFSB suggests that there be either a department or a person within 
the bank, a sort of Shari’ah compliance officer or department (ISCU), who 
will disseminate the fatwas and monitor day–to–day compliance with them 
by bank operations and financial instruments.  This person should also be 
independent from other departments, just as the audit function in most any 
standard publicly traded corporations or banks in the United States is 
independent.  The third organism of Shari’ah compliance at the bank or 
corporation level would be the internal Shari’ah compliance review and 
audit function (ISRU), the task of which is to verify compliance with 
Shari’ah as defined in the fatwas and to recommend the strengthening or 
modification of systems to ensure such compliance if weaknesses are 
detected.  This function is similar to that of an internal audit department in 
most any standard publicly traded corporations or banks in the United 
States, but its task is more specific and targeted than that of a standard 
corporate audit department.  An annual Shari’ah compliance review—much 
like the typical annual financial audit of a Western bank—is a further 
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Accordingly, the corporate governance framework recommended by the 
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As already mentioned, the major Western banks follow the Basel 
Accords in accordance with and interpreted by their own national regulatory 
structures.  Because the major Western banks are the ones who, as a 
practical matter, control most of the finances for the world’s commerce, 
they are the ones that count in conventional banking.  For this reason, 
among others, Basel II is respected and fairly well followed around the 
world.  As we have seen, this is why banking activities are similar in the 
major world capitals. 
The IFSB, on the other hand, and other such institutions recognize “the  
detailed scope of the Shari’ah Governance System may vary from one 
jurisdiction to another, depending on the types of structures adopted.”117  
The IFSB promulgates merely “guiding principles.”  Nothing is mandated, 
monitored, or controlled. 
The AAOIFI, headquartered in Bahrain, also understands the problems 
of standardization in an industry that is located in many countries with 
differing political, commercial and religious standards, and expects that the 
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2011] The Corporate Governance of Islamic Banks 275 
 
institutions will implement its standards to the extent that they wish to do so 
or are able to do so.118   
Despite all the hype and the successes of Islamic banks and the recent 
favorable press, all is not milk and honey.  The Financial Times has 
reported that Islamic banking could play a useful role in our troubled 
financial world, but that it would not be a “silver bullet” for the crisis.119  It 
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 119. John Aglionby, Islamic Banks Urged to Show the Way, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0f74e17a-0757-11de-9294-000077b07658.html. 
276 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
appears that greater transparency and standardization are required 
throughout the industry as a whole, since “[t]he . . . combination of 
requirements of Shari’ah compliance and business performance raises 
specific challenges and agency problems, and underlines the need for 
distinctive [corporate governance] structures.”120  The CEO of the recently 
formed and licensed BBK Capanova, the investment bank owned by the 
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, has said the industry needs to improve its 
transparency, and others have echoed this call.121   
Even though Islamic banking and financial institutions contend that they 
base themselves on piety, concern for social justice and the laws of God, 
some, such as Nobel Laureate Economist Hirschman, have contended that 
generally businesses, individuals, and organizations suffer legal and ethical 
lapses.122  Islamic bankers have proven to be no exception, and “[t]he 
history of Islamic finance shows that cases of [corporate governance] 
failures, neglect of minority shareholders’ interests, imprudent lending and 
excessive risk taking by management.”123  
There appear to be at least three possible reasons why the Islamic banks 
have not suffered much in the current stage of the world economic crisis, 
and they all stem from their governance based on Shari’ah principles.  First, 
because the banks share in the profits or losses of their borrowers’ ventures 
(and in the case of mortgages, generally the mortgage is on the books of the 
bank until paid off), which is a result of the principle of no interest, the 
Islamic bank is very careful about where they put their money; credit 
worthiness is therefore a paramount concern.  Second, since money is not be 
made from money and uncertainty or gambling is prohibited, the bundling 
and securitization of financial instruments—the bundling and further selling 
of loans, or making and selling of derivatives,124 for example—is prohibited. 
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The bank generally keeps the paper and this not only makes the bank 
concerned about proper credit checks, but it inhibits the bank’s ability to 
multiply capital; that is, continue to lend based on a fixed amount of 
reserves.  And finally, because Islamic banking does not allow the same 
level of the fractionalizing of  reserves as conventional banks, (that is, not 
all deposits can be used for certain types of—or long term—lending)  
theoretically the bank puts a lower amount of its total reserves at risk.  Even 
so, Islamic bankers believe that the recent world financial crisis has “leveled 
the playing field,” making it easier for Islamic banks to compete; but they 
also believe that the industry has to work to come up with new and 
innovative financial instruments in order to appeal to a broader market.125 
CONCLUSION 
No international institution governs, monitors or controls the internal 
corporate governance standards in the far–flung Islamic banks, and because 
an important aspect of the internal standards is Shari’ah compliance, this 
gives rise to differing standards for financial instruments and financial 
operations from place to place.  So of course, in order for Islamic banks to 
have universal appeal and full cross–border application, most believe that 
they will have to have standardized practices.  This will require 
standardized governance structures.  How long this will take is an open 
question.  Conventional banks took centuries to evolve into what they are 
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